

Villa Palkenstein  
PARKSTRASSE 16

15 Feb Trans To <sup>KSCA Neishen Hall</sup> Bud 12

15 April Cmt

OKW Nord

OKW Sud

11 April OKW + OKL merged

→ 15 April

21 April Wessel-Zesse

By 15 April Union

File - 132

29 July W - Wiesbaden.

21 Aug 6 To USA

30 Aug to Blue House

3 US officers

middle sent Baum

3 months in investigation  
End

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REINHARD GEHLEN'S POSTWAR ROLE IN PERSPECTIVE

The political polarization of the world was well underway before the American and Russian armies met at the Elbe. James Burnham in his landmark 1947 book, "The Struggle for the World", began that farsighted effort with the sentence: "The Third World War began in April 1944." He was describing a mutiny of communist Greek sailors in a ship under British protection in the port of Alexandria.

Satisfying my curiosity as to how early Reinhard Gehlen made his own estimate on the postwar world was high on my personal agenda in my early years in Pullach. I concluded within a year or two that as early as 1942 he foresaw that the forces of history already on the move probably would produce a bipolar world with the United States and the Soviet Union contending for influence. This idea had obviously gained strength in his mind by the time he met the Americans in May 1945.

By the time I met him in 1948, Reinhard Gehlen was a man who knew, in political terms, exactly what he believed in and what he wanted to do to accomplish his political goals. And in the eight years that followed, with amazing persistence, Gehlen achieved what he set out to do: To build a German intelligence service that could be integrated in an emerging postwar German government that would find its place in a Western alliance headed by the United States in which a united Western Europe would have a central importance. In this conviction, there were no doubts and no vacillation.

The almost immediate emergence at the end of WW II of political conflicts between the USSR and the Western alliance, accompanied almost from the first by the perception of the West that armed conflict could not be ruled out, created an immediate need for intelligence on the intentions and capabilities of the Soviets. Germany had just completed three years of armed conflict with Soviet forces preceded by several decades in which intelligence on Russia had been high on Germany's national agenda. Gehlen's negotiating position was apparent. In terms of skilled and experienced human resources with an organized body of data on the Soviet armed forces, Gehlen's group obviously had a great deal to offer the West.

The senior US military intelligence official in Europe in 1946 made essentially a pragmatic decision to exploit these assets and the knowledge of the Soviets that Gehlen brought from his principal wartime role as chief of Fremde Herre Ost. The decision of General Sibert was consciously not a political matter. There is no record that the first steps with the Gehlen organization were presented to the US government as politically significant. But for Gehlen, the agreement with the US had to be seen in

political terms -- the opening of a long-term relationship with the West.

Gehlen provided the surviving cadre of the German General Staff a lifeboat in a tumultuous geopolitical sea left by a war that went all the way to "unconditional surrender." The United States government certainly was not consciously motivated in the immediate aftermath of the war by an interest in saving a cadre of experienced German officers around whom a future German intelligence service and armed forces could be built. But by 1948 it was quite evident that the survivors of the German General Staff were well represented in the Gehlen group. Fortunately for both Gehlen and his American sponsors, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg had rejected the effort of the prosecutor to indict and convict the General Staff. Not surprisingly, General I.T. Nikitchenko, the Soviet member of the International Military Tribunal, had filed a dissenting view.

By early 1949 it was apparent to any serious observer of world events that a new military alliance was emerging in the West, that the defense of Europe would be a commitment of such an alliance and that the part of Germany that was not occupied by the Soviet forces would eventually become a recognized nation state, would join and be welcomed into a Western alliance.

Gehlen provided a haven in the early years for a number of former officers of the German armed forces who were clearly destined to return to conventional military careers. Several of the Americans that worked with the Gehlen organization developed the theory that Gehlen saw himself as a latter-day von Seeckt aspiring to use the interim association with the Americans and the Western Europeans as a springboard to lead the rebuilding of a German General Staff which he would head.

I never shared this view -- partly because of my perception that building an intelligence service was his genuine goal and partly because of my conclusion by early in 1949 that Adolf Heusinger, then the head of Gehlen's staff preparing intelligence studies and estimates, had the credentials to play the principal role in Germany's initial remilitarization and finding its place militarily in the Western alliance. But more important, Gehlen also seemed to assume that Heusinger's future lay in resumption of his military career.

When the German armed forces were formed, many in the initial cadres came out of the Gehlen organization or from among the hundreds of former German officers who identified in some way with the political and psychological rationale developed by Gehlen and his senior associates. Because professional contacts with the US and Western European military staffs gradually became routine for Gehlen's senior staff in Pullach, the later transition for these former officers back into uniform within the German niche in the emerging NATO alliance came easily.

Efforts by interested observers to assess the ultimate significance of the Gehlen organization in the rebuilding of Germany and its eventual integration into Western Europe and the NATO alliance often focus on two issues: (1) the extent to which the Soviets succeeded in penetrating the organization; and (2) the extent to which unacceptably tainted figures out of the intelligence, security and military organization affiliated with the NSDAP had been utilized by Gehlen.

Because the leadership of the Gehlen organization lacked any legal status in Germany and thus no official means for motivating or controlling employees, Gehlen faced serious limitations in carrying out security investigations of his subordinates. Given the realities of a divided Germany with one part under Soviet control, a massive and sometime successful Soviet effort to penetrate the organization was, from the first, assumed. In the early postwar years, West Germany was quite accurately described as an "intelligence jungle." By the early 1950s, something over 90% of the Soviet-controlled espionage cases brought to trial in the non-communist world, occurred in West Germany. It would have been remarkable if there had not been a Felde case. All of the Western governments, without the vulnerabilities of being half of a recently divided nation, bitterly experienced KGB and GRU penetrations into vitally sensitive offices.


Gehlen's heavy reliance on long-standing professional, personal and family connections within military circles, particularly the German General Staff, reflected his confidence in the probable security and loyalty of these familiar groups. In his heavy reliance on the German military, Gehlen initially paid the price of a staff with limited experience in operational intelligence tradecraft that is claimed as professionally essential by all of the Western services as well as those of the communist countries. Basically, the NSDAP had taken over and politicized all of the operating police, security and intelligence organizations of Nazi Germany some years before the final defeat in 1945. There is no doubt that some of the operating elements only loosely controlled and physically remote from Gehlen and his staff were constantly tempted to draw on the professional experience of available but politically unacceptable operators. This was particularly true in the chaotic circumstances that existed in Germany during at least the first five years after the end of the war. But by the beginning of the 1950s when legalization of the organization as the German service became Gehlen's preoccupation, he had too much at stake politically in Bonn and with the Western intelligence services to assume the political risk of harboring politically tainted intelligence and security specialists from the Third Reich.

Although Gehlen espoused the "ueberparteilich" code of the General Staff, there is no doubt that his political inclinations in the early postwar years moved along the same lines as those of the Adenauer and the Christian Socialist movement in Western Europe. And from the first he actively supported the earliest

efforts of the French leaders dedicated to the idea of a united Western Europe. Gehlen's political balance within Germany was evident in the fact that his first meeting with Chancellor Conrad Adenauer was followed by just twenty four hours with his first meeting with Kurt Schumacher, the strong leaders of the opposition Socialist Party. The integration of the Gehlen organization into the Bonn government as the BND on 1 April 1956 appeared to have broad political support.

In a sense, the great significance of Gehlen's accomplishment was political and must be judged in context of the evolution of the Western alliance that has kept Europe at peace for almost 45 years. It would be too much to say that it didn't matter politically that an occasional SD member turned up in the Gehlen organization or to argue that a high level spy of Felde's character did not endanger hundreds of Gehlen sources in communist territory and constitute a great embarrassment for Gehlen as head of the service. The costliness of hostile penetrations ultimately directed by the KGB has been well documented in the hundreds of "damage assessments" that have followed the exposure of Soviet penetrations of Western governments. But ultimately, history must assess what Reinhard Gehlen did in the context of Germany's postwar political transition from an enemy to an ally of the Western alliance.

Finally, a word about Gehlen's personal goal. My last conversation with Reinhard Gehlen was in the simple circumstances of his home at Berg on Strarnberger See. He was obviously on his death bed, weak, drawn and barely able to communicate. Herta Gehlen sat in a chair at the foot of his bed. His last words to me, uttered with a visible effort, was an expression of appreciation for what I had done to help him achieve "den Traum meines Lebens -- Der Dienst."

  
J. Critchfield 22 September 1988

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*Achse "Der Traum meines Lebens --*  
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*22 Sept 58*

## RECOLLECTIONS ABOUT REINHARD GEHLEN

My association with Reinhard Gehlen covered almost three decades. The first eight years were largely in the compound at Pullach which we called Nicolaus. For seven of these years his office and mine were separated by a small, walled-in cobblestone courtyard where he could observe anyone coming to or leaving my office and I could look down from my second floor office on anyone arriving or leaving his office. For two intelligence officers whose nations had just finished a war as enemies, that was a fairly intimate arrangement -- particularly when you consider Gehlen's proclivity for surrounding his future German intelligence service with some secrecy. I saw Gehlen through good times and bad -- some pretty bad -- to his achievement of becoming the first President of the Intelligence Service of the German Federal Republic which, by then was our full ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization sharing a multitude of top secrets. The German Service was founded on 1 April 1956 in one of our bad times. Gehlen's distrust of me was at a peak. Between them, the Soviet KGB and the American CIC had really muddied the waters. And the American Army, which had responded to Gehlen's proposal at the end of the war and supported his effort for three years, had made its own awkward effort in 1955 to persuade Adenauer and his advisors to ditch Gehlen and his organization in favor of starting all over again with something that would look more like an Army G-2. Gehlen was not sure what my role had been in all of this -- in fact there was none --

and was pretty unhappy with the Americans.

There was almost nothing to indicate that 31 March was the last day of CIA's "holding in trust" the Gehlen Organization. There seemed to be no recognition in Nicolaus that the objective had been seized, that the long awaited day was at hand. There was no celebration -- not even a private, joint popping of a bottle of Henkel Champagne. I think that Gehlen had not focused on the full implication of the change. I have no recollection that even the German staff alone made much of the event. But I made the decision that the Stars and Stripes that had flown over Nicolaus since 1945 would come down for the last time. The only ceremony marking the day had occurred at eleven o'clock on 31 March when the Finance Ministry in Bonn sent an official to Pullach to reimburse us for DM 2 million we had advanced to the Gehlen Organization to bridge the transition. He brought a suitcase with DM 2 million which went into Horst Wendlands hands in one room in a kind of escrow arrangement to keep both sides honest. I, in another office then signed the named of Kent J. Marshall on behalf of the United States Government certifying that I had indeed been reimbursed in full for our earlier advance. We kept the DM 2 million and the Bonn official, without even meeting Kent J. Marshall, returned to Bonn his mission accomplished. That was the only ceremony of which I have any recollection.

My problems with Gehlen were that I found it hard to maintain his trust and that he didn't tolerate easily opinions of others on a lot of issues we had faced together. In time he came to trust me more and to recognize that there had been some merit in positions I had taken on behalf of CIA. In his book "Der Dienst" he went so far as describe a few of the issues on which I prevailed as his idea all along. He had fretted and fumed impatiently for legalization of his service, attacking us Americans for not forcing a decision. But in the end, it was such a wise thing to delay until the Federal Republic was sovereign the decision to act entirely on its own in forming the BND. There was also the issue of a full separation of internal counterespionage from foreign intelligence. There was an educational process on this issue; nothing in Gehlen's experience had forced him to think this issue through. In the end, he did. And so did Adenauer and the Bundestag.

Gehlen went through some very bad times after my departure. The case of Heinz Felfe, a KGB penetration right in the middle of his own counterespionage. Then there was an internal political flap called "Te Spiegel Affair" which put a great strain on his relations with the Chancellor and the Bundestag. In 1968 he visited Washington on the occasion of his retirement. I was eight years into a different assignment as head of CIA's Middle East and South Asian operations and no longer following the development of German intelligence. But I saw Gehlen several

times, participated in the rendering of honor to an Old Cold Warrior and we both went sailing on the Chesapeake Bay with Ed Petty, a veteran of many years in Pullach. Gehlen, like Petty, had in the interim become an avid sailor. In a letter to an associate written during his Washington visit Gehlen wrote the following lines: "-----

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Gehlen clearly was moving toward the view that maybe I was, after all, probably OK. A few years later his extended family assembled at his home on the Starnbergersee to celebrate his 70th birthday. His secretary of thirty years and I were the only outsiders invited. My stock was still rising. Then in 1974, apropos of nothing at all, there arrived in the mail delivered to my apartment in Washington, a large silver dish with an engraved inscription of my name and "Inerung an langjahriger Zussamenarbit --- December 1974, Reinhard Gehlen." Several years later during a visit to Europe my wife and I stopped to have tea with the Gehlens at their home in Berg. After some minutes he took my arm, pulling me toward the sofa to sit side by side. Tucking his arm under mine, he asked my wife to take our picture in this firs-ever warmly personal arrangement. Obviously, the distrusted side of my image of the early 1950s was fading.

The last time I saw Gehlen was a few days before his death in 1977. I was flying to the Middle East and broke my trip in Munich to see him. He was very ill from cancer, confined to the bedroom of the small house he constructed in the rear garden of his home at Berg when he retired. He was emaciated, his face drawn and sallow in color. He appeared to be very weak; talking at all was a distinct effort. Mrs. Gehlen was seated in a chair close to the foot of his bed. He managed to carry on a short conversation and then lapsed into what appeared to be a deep sleep. I softly said to Mrs. Gehlen that I would leave. His eyes flickered and one thin hand made a small movement in my direction. One word came from his lips: "Warten" (Wait). After resting a few minutes more he made an effort to turn his face in my direction and said in barely audible German: "Before you go, I want to thank you for helping me achieve the dream of my life, the Service." I gently pressed down on his outstretched thin hand once and departed. It occurred to me as I drove back toward Munich that this put to rest the debate of earlier years about Gehlen's ambition. A few days later a message reached me that Gehlen had died.

Sometime after the 1 April <sup>1956</sup> 1949 founding of the BND, Gehlen had designed a medallion cast in gold showing Saint George slaying the dragon. These were cast and sequentially numbered. I suppose he and Adenauer were the recipients of 1 and 2. They should have been. Wessel and Heusinger would have been my candidates for 3. Dr. Herbert Globke would also have been a

contender.

## THE SHELTERED EXISTENCE OF A YOUNG GENERAL STAFF OFFICER

Gehlen, on 9 May 1945, was a German officer virtually unknown outside of what remained of the German General staff on the Eastern Front. He had achieved the German rank equivalent to that of a US brigadier general only late in the war. I have found only very rare references to him in the hundreds of postwar books on the Third Reich and the war years. He was an officer who matured in the protected environment of the German General Staff under Ludwig Beck and his successor, Franz Halder. General Beck, in his four years as Chief of the General Staff, met Hitler only once. Halder, the Chief of Staff when Hitler was threatening in 1938 to go into Czechoslovakia, made tangible preparations to violate his officer's oath and remove Hitler from power. Chamberlin's "peace in our time" concession to Hitler at Munich catapulted Hitler to a plateau of popularity with the German people which doomed Halder's plans. That was probably the last real window of opportunity for the General Staff to end Hitler's march into World War II. The solidarity of the General Staff began to crumble as Hitler moved from one easy victory to another in 1939, 1940 and most of 1941. By 1942 when the Russians went on the offensive and America entered the war, it was too late. At Casablanca in early 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill committed their nations to continue the war until

German's "unconditional surrender."

Gehlen was serious, hard-working, well-schooled as a staff officer and personally seen as very efficient by his superiors and colleagues in the General Staff. His isolation within this military structure removed him from any significant contact with civilian life and the rise of the Nazi party. Like all young professional officers who were commissioned in the Weimar era, he understood that Hitler and his ilk were inferior people that, it had to be admitted, had raised Germany out of its economic chaos and cast off the restraints of Versailles -- two accomplishments that alone commended Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party to German officers of all ages and origins.

#### THE INFLUENCE OF GENERAL FRANZ HALDER

Gehlen, as a proficient, well-trained and presentable staff officer first came under Halder's close supervision and influence starting in 1939 when Gehlen served for a brief period as Halder's aide. After the war, Halder went no further than to say that "Gehlen was one of our best young officers in the General Staff." Halder had closely observed Colonel Gehlen in the three years that Gehlen had worked directly under Adolf Heusinger in the planning and staff supervision of the entire Balkans campaign and the first year of the war against the Soviet Union. Adolf Heusinger, the head of the operations division of the General Staff was, in those years of expanding warfare on the Eastern Front, as close to



Halder as anyone in the General Staff. Halder would certainly have consulted him in reaching the decision, so critical to both Heusinger and Gehlen in the postwar years, to give Gehlen the Fremde Heere Ost job. Halder assigned Colonel Gehlen on 1 April 1942 to become the head of a division of the General Staff, Fremde Heere Ost or Foreign Armies East. The influence of Halder and Heusinger on Gehlen continued, interrupted intermittently, through the war and all of the critical decade after WW II. Through the three years after his assignment to Fremde Heere Ost, even after Halder's break with Hitler in September 1942, Gehlen worked in the shadow of Adolf Heusinger. The products of Gehlen's labor as chief of the intelligence staff were normally presented daily to the Chief of Staff and then integrated into the Chief of Staff's and Heusinger's reports to CINCs on the Eastern Front and, once Hitler had assumed personal command on the Eastern Front, to Hitler and his entourage -- mainly at the Wolfschanze near Angersberg. With Hitler only thirty minutes away at Angersberg during many months of the war on the Eastern Front, it is significant that Gehlen was present at meetings with him only three or four times.

#### THE PERFORMANCE OF FREMDE HEERE OST UNDER GEHLEN

I am not, in this book, making any effort to assess the performance of Fremde Heere Ost, the German G-2 staff on the Eastern Front in Germany's long war with the Soviet Union. It is

not really relevant to the Gehlen story after 1945 beyond the fact that he had headed Fremde Heere Ost and had gotten consistently good ratings from Halder and Heusinger. Scholars and historians of WW II have studied the quality of Fremde Heere Ost production and reporting of intelligence during Gehlen's tenure. Its successes and failures and Gehlen's personal experiences are, for my purposes, better subject to meaningful analysis when addressed separately. I have, over the years, talked with many officers who were in a position to observe Gehlen and the production of his staff during the period that Gehlen was in charge -- the three years from April 1942 to his relief of that post in April 1945 when the Eastern Front was collapsing. Most agree that Gehlen as a staff officer, was dedicated, innovative, hard-working and efficient and appeared to have the confidence and support of his immediate superiors in the General Staff. All emphasize that providing timely and accurate short term Soviet order of battle and forecasts became increasingly difficult in the deteriorating circumstances on the Eastern Front.

Gehlen, as the German G-2 on the Eastern Front, had at his disposal the reporting of the Abwehr and was particularly dependent on Leitstelle I Ost, the arm of the Abwehr that ran agents to collect intelligence on the Eastern Front. The Abwehr, like the General Staff, established an advanced headquarters in Eastern Prussia which Admiral Canaris, head of the Abwehr until early 1944, sometimes occupied. Gehlen's principal contact in the Abwehr was Herman Baun, a lieutenant colonel at the end of the

war, who was born in Russia of ethnic German parents. Fremde Heere Ost itself conducted no agent operations. For intelligence collected by secret agents, Gehlen relied mainly on Baun's Leitstelle I Ost over which he could exercise no direct control. Baun's commander was Admiral Canaris. Without Baun and the surviving remnants of his wartime espionage organization in postwar Germany, there might well have been no Gehlen Organization in the decade after the end of WW II. What G-2 USFET wanted by 1946 was information on Soviet units in East Germany. Baun could produce these. But the value of the intelligence Baun produced, was significantly enhanced by the evaluations done by Gerhard Wessel's FHA group at Oberuersel.

#### GEHLEN AND THE 20TH OF JULY 1944

Reinhard Gehlen was not a natural conspirator. And the Gestapo, in the manhunt after the 20th of July, did not seem to regard him as one. He was in a hospital for a period just before and just after the failed effort to kill Hitler. I believe that it is a fact that not one officer in Fremde Heere Ost was either interrogated or arrested after the 20th of July. Heusinger, who was not in Fremde Heere Ost, was standing immediately adjacent to Hitler when bomb exploded, was wounded, hospitalized and immediately arrested and removed to Berlin for interrogation in the Gestapo's prison on Prinz Albrechtstrasse. Heusinger spent some time there along with his friend Hans Speidel. Eventually, both were released. Halder, no longer in an important position,

was also arrested after the 20th of July and narrowly escaped the fate of Admiral Canaris and others who were brutally executed in the final months of Hitler's rule.

Gehlen's colleagues who had served with him in the General Staff in the Mauernwald -- and there were after 1948 many of them in Pullach -- described him, at that time of the plot, as apolitical but with an interest mainly in the strategic implications of the way the war was going in the summer of 1944. I have found no real evidence that Gehlen was involved in any way in the 20th of July. I would not have expected him to be. By July 1944 Gehlen was fully convinced that the war was lost and claimed to have tested and found the allied commitment to "unconditional surrender" to be the real thing. His daily focus was still on the advancing enemy. If Gehlen heard in 1944 about a plot against Hitler, he made no effort to involve himself in that particular conspiracy. Within nine months after the 20th of July, Gehlen moved decisively into his own conspiracy, preparing to get his files, his staff and his ideas into the hands of the Americans -- a conspiracy to be played out in the last days of the war. By April 1945, Gehlen was not concerned with Hitler's fate; the Soviet army was approaching Berlin and would deal with Hitler one way or another. But even then Gehlen was uneasy and went to some effort to get at least a shred of legal sanction, somewhat ex post facto, for what he had done and planned to do. General August Winter, the operations officer of OKW at the end of the war, provided Gehlen with a document providing a dubious shred of

legal authority to carry out his plans. Also, Gehlen waited until the last shot had been fired, and then a decent interval of two months to reveal his plan to the enemy. But by then he was technically a POW and Captain John Boker was his interrogator.

In the end,, Gehlen's move toward a role in the West became no more than the leading edge in Germany's move into NATO and the Western European Union. Indeed, in 1986 the Bonn government staged a fairly elaborate, although discreet, celebration of forty years of US- German cooperation in international security affair -- the forty years dating from Gehlen's mythical "Gentlemen's Agreement" with Edwin L. Sibert, the then G-2 of the United States Forces in Europe. Since Sibert was dead by then, by some process of elimination, I became the symbolic American speaker at that event.

In his book Gehlen made the statement that "high treason is high treason" and then described the conditions under which it becomes justified -- one of them being a reasonable prospect of success. Those who were involved and fully committed to the plot against Hitler had clearly gone through the agonizing process of weighing the crime of high treason against the crimes of the regime they sought to remove. I was never able to persuade Gehlen to reveal to me his thoughts in these terms. Gehlen never defended, in our conversations, the evil acts of the Third Reich. But I doubt that he ever felt a practical need to place on the balanced scale of justice, the crime of high treason against what

the Tribunal later described as "crimes against peace, crimes against humanity etc..."

## THE OATH OF LOYALTY TO ADOLF HITLER

Nothing interested me more in my years of close association with former German officers than their famous oath to Adolf Hitler as a leader -- not an oath to the flag or the nation or the "fatherland" but an oath to an individual who took the nation not only to defeat and destruction but, more costly, to great damage to the reputation and self esteem of the German people. The one secret that for me remains locked up in the psyche of the German officers corps of the Third Reich is why an oath to Hitler, particularly as the character of his regime became clear, had real meaning.

## PLEDGING ALLIANCE TO THE FLAG AND TO THE REPUBLIC FOR WHICH IT STANDS...AN AMERICAN VIEWPOINT

From the age of six, I joined my classmates at the opening of school each morning, pledging my "allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the republic for which it stands..." I assume I took a comparable oath on becoming a commissioned officer which said more or less the same thing. This carries, of course, the commitment to obey the orders of the Command-in-Chief ... but only up to a point. Defining that point

has been and will continue to be debated in every nation. The issue arises, in democratic countries, with service in the armed forces and in being an intelligence officer in today's world.

I long ago was surprised to discover, that what I will call "patriotism" for want of a better word, has probably been the single strongest and most durable emotion I have experienced as an adult American. I do not think this has been unusual for my generation; it obviously became confused during the Vietnam War. It is a remarkable motivating force. The poetry that was most often quoted in the press as we went off to WW II was the "Ode to Lucretia" by the British romantic poet Richard Lovelace ending with the line "I could not love thee dear so much, loved I not honor more." Not everyone who served in WW II shared these romantic sentiments which were, we know, exposed to more severe testing in the course of the Vietnam War. The issue became more complex when, deep into the Cold War, the US Congress addressed the legality of assassination as an option of Americans, particularly intelligence and military personnel actively engaged "in peacetime" in the "Cold War." The question was additionally complicated by the issue of "terrorism" and the expanding range of limited wars including communists moving in on "national wars of liberation."

For a soldier serving in the armed forces of the United States legally at war with the German nation, it was quite uncomplicated. Two men meet in battle, both with a mission and

orders to kill and the means to do so. It was a set scenario. One will die. Neither is asked or permitted to question the morality, the legality or the practicality of the act. On the latter point, the individual soldier is almost never in a position to judge whether a particular act advances the established aims of the nation in going to war. Hesitating to act or deserting in the face of the enemy was in WW II a certain route to a court martial, disgrace, dishonorable discharge, prison and even, as Private Eddie Slavik learned, a death sentence signed by the nation's top soldier, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. In Germany after victory we were far less squeamish about capital punishment, handing out something over 150, most of which were carried out.

In the conflicts since WW II, including the Cold War with its divers and sporadic conflicts up and down the scale of warfare, the soldier, airman, sailor and intelligence officer have found it necessary to make more individual decisions in a great variety of circumstances. This has been true of the whole gamut of covert operations such as the much publicized Iran-Contra affair. The individual warrior, including the civilian intelligence officer, who might have envisaged himself as a warrior, must now more frequently ask himself a three part question for his own protection. Is it legal? Is it moral -- and by what standards? Is it likely to accomplish a stated purpose -- and by whose judgement? Experiences in war, my assignments in Heidelberg and Vienna in the first years of the occupation and, above all, a close association over eight years with so many former German



officers, old Abwehr hands and more than a few former members of the SD, had sharpened my sensitivities to these issues as I left Germany at the age of thirty nine.

Taking the oath to Hitler in 1934 may have been, as some argue, only one easy step from an oath to the Kaiser. Others argue that it was a pragmatic action to avoid a showdown at the time with a leader who was building a new Germany and throwing off the shackles of Versailles and, in the process, of restoring the self esteem of the German people after the war of 1914-1918. Maintaining to the bitter end an oath to Adolf Hitler, if that in truth was a dominating factor, was and remains incomprehensible, I believe, to most Americans. Since we have never had a monarch and an oath to an individual, it is foreign to our constitutional system in the United States.

I hasten to add that in later long years as the head of CIA operations in the Middle East and South Asia, I acquired a great deal more experience in living with monarchs and a variety of military dictators who, to a man, expected the officers of their armed forces and their intelligence to swear undying loyalty. And most of them did and stuck with it. I found it quite possible to coexist comfortably with most. Admittedly we tried harder to help some of these monarchs and dictators more than others and were not entirely averse, when ordered to do so, to encourage others to move on -- not always with much success, as Gamal Abd al Nasser, Muammer Qadhafi, Saddam Hussein and others

have demonstrated. Our moral and legal structure remains intact. It is OK to kill an Iraqi in Desert Storm; but an effort to dispose of the Iraqi leaders in the grey area after Desert Storm got the cease-fire, would be quite illegal and might well bring the American officer who called the shot to do so before a "special prosecutor." I leave aside the issues of morality and whether, in practical political terms, it would be a better Middle East without Qadhafi and Saddam Hussein, our favorite villains in the region.

### GEHLEN THE PERSON

Reinhard Gehlen was not a man given to conversations about abstract philosophical issues. In all the years I knew him, we never engaged in either casual or serious conversations on cultural interests -- theater, opera, literature, poetry. Indeed, I never heard of Reinhard Gehlen going to the theater or opera. His secretary and special assistant of more than forty years put it very succinctly in a conversation with me in June 1993: "Er war sachlich." This translates as real, to-the-point, business-like, material and relevant. Gehlen was all of the above.

On one occasion in my early years in Pullach, Gehlen proposed we spend several days skiing together and arranged for us to use an Alpine Hut of the Bavarian Border Police a short distance from a skiing area known as Sudelfeld near the Austrian border. It snowed heavily for three days and we made no effort to reach the lift at the Sudelfeld. We ventured out once or twice into the

deep snow. At some point in his military training Gehlen had learned the military art of skiing. He demonstrated to me the technique of the telemark turn -- the only time I ever saw it done. The custodian of the hut appeared only to stoke the stove and to supply simply prepared food. Otherwise, we simply talked -- all business related politics and people. It was the only occasion on which I ever saw Gehlen on skis.

During a trip of several weeks around the United States in late 1951 accompanied only by Heinz Herre, we often had long stretches of rail travel. One day when the gregarious Herre was exploring the fairly luxurious train, Gehlen and I were sitting alone in our compartment watching the majestic Rockies slide by. I ventured into the question of religion. Of course, he said, my opposition to communism is indicative of the fact that I am a religious man. I accepted that as an answer and never touched on it again.

## HERTA GEHLEN

Someone who knew the Gehlen family well, described Reinhard Gehlen as "a German father in a German house which implied there were rules, his. They were old-fashioned in a German sense and they were followed. I suppose he was a kind of General Staff Officer in his own home. But the offsetting influence of Herta Gehlen within the family was the dominate influence that shows through in her children and in the character of the family that has

emerged as the children have become adults and Herta Gehlen has been left alone to set the matriarchal influence and character of the still closely knit family. I do not see, given the long hours and stresses under which Gehlen existed, how he could have afforded to be other than to-the-point with his children.

Herta Gehlen, the wife of Reinhard Gehlen, is in her quiet and happy way very openly a devoted and active member of the church. She came from an aristocratic background and it shows. I spent much of a 1993 June day at her daughter Khaterina's home in Berg with her and her extended family. Berg, a small village in the Bavarian countryside, is situated perhaps a mile above the Gehlen's home closer to the lake. Katherina in the late 1950s attended Hunter College in New York City and spent her holidays at my home in the Virginia countryside where she became very much a member of my family. Herta Gehlen at the age of 89 is a woman who appears to be in remarkably good health, active, poised, well informed and full of humor and outgoing grace. Seemingly she enjoys her matriarchal role with all four of her children and their families living within an hour's drive of Berg am Starnbergersee where she continues to live. All who have known her for many years express wonderment at how she seems to be blossoming late in life. I think that living through the turbulent and troubled years with Reinhard Gehlen could not have been an easy life.

## AT HOME -- BERG AM STARNBERGERSEE

In my early years in Pullach, Herta Gehlen and her four young children shared the house which also served as Gehlen's quarters and office. After a year or two, I enthusiastically supported the suggestion of his deputy, Horst Wendland, to assist Gehlen in acquiring a home for this family outside of Nicolaus. We had established a program to provide housing loans for the resettlement outside of Nicolaus of Gehlen and his staff, particularly those with families. Real estate was still undervalued at that time. Purchase of the wooden frame house and the surrounding lot at Berg required a loan of DM 48,000. I never knew whether this covered the entire purchase price. Not long before Gehlen's move to Berg, the owner of the requisitioned house in Solln that I occupied approached me with the offer to sell me this house, which was about the same size and of sturdier construction than Gehlen's new home, for DM 55,000. I was not at all in the market for a German house but the offered price suggested that Gehlen might have acquired his house for something in the same price range. Gehlen insisted that he could handle monthly payments of DM 3000, at that time the equivalent of roughly \$720 a month. This represented a major part of his salary. But he was a man with no visible expensive habits or interests. He and his family had a frugal if not an austere life style. I never knew them to take a vacation; they appeared to spend virtually nothing on recreation or luxuries. The

housing loan was, in any case, fully repaid within two years. The matter was handled routinely and was never a matter of discussion between Gehlen and me until he invited me out to see his new home shortly after moving in.

Gehlen's house was in Berg am Starnbergersee, not far from the home of Prince Albrecht von Wittelsbach, precisely the place made famous in the mysterious drowning of "Mad King Ludwig" of Bavaria. When Gehlen retired in 1968 he ordered a small pre-fab house which was installed on a cement foundation on the same lot and immediately behind the original house. Gehlen and his wife moved into this, turning the principal house over to his son Christoph and his family. It was in this extremely modest house in the rear garden that I saw Gehlen just a few days before his death.

✕ ✕ ✕ { Gehlen's new house was close to but not directly on the water. When I prepared to leave Germany in 1956, Dr. Hans Winter, a hybrid combination of medical doctor and intelligence officer on Gehlen's staff proposed that I sell our boat to Gehlen. His staff, including his medical doctor, had tried unsuccessfully to interest Gehlen in some form of recreation and relaxation. He was not a skier. I never saw him take anything resembling a long walk. He did not even think about golf or tennis. As a young officer he had attended a course for mounted officers and had, I was told, become a quite accomplished equestrian. But I never saw him near a horse although riding clubs were reappearing in much of

Chancellor's moves on remilitarization. During 1955 Gehlen at times believe that history was passing him by and passed through a severe crisis of confidence regarding his own future and his relations with the Americans. By the year end Gehlen was moderately encouraged by signals he received from Adenauer. By the end of 1950, intelligence and remilitarization developments had clearly separated.

The events in 1950, which I have described as "The Year of Decision" erased any doubts I might of had about Gehlen's role in drafting the blue-print for the new Bundeswehr and Germany's eventual entry into NATO and the Western European Union. Gehlen had clearly made a decision in early 1948 to provide a temporary supporting structure for the three generals that were preparing themselves to advise the future German government on the whole question of a German role in the defense of Europe. Heusinger, as head of the evaluation staff in Pullach had a supporting facility and staff that was a factor in the preparedness of the three generals to move in the summer of 1950.

Gehlen became a party to the conflict with Schwerin only when Schwerin was able to expand his charter to include intelligence -- an effort that never got off the ground. He followed closely the dramatic events of that summer of 1950 and assured his future by concurrently supplying Adenauer with timely and precisely tailored intelligence. During 1950 Gehlen in fact despaired that events were passing him by and that the Americans were

providing him no critical political intervention at the moment he perceived a need. CIA simply disagreed with him that Schwerin was more than a passing episode and that any political initiative to precipitate serious discussion of a future German intelligence service would be very premature. This disagreement on timing was to become an almost seasonal issue. American High Commissioner John J. McCloy was prepared in early 1950 to inform Adenauer of our position on supporting the Gehlen Organization and to suggest that perhaps the Chancellor should acquaint himself with Gehlen. That effort failed for reasons that I will get to elsewhere in this book. McCloy remained aloof, with CIA's full agreement, from the entire chain of events in Bonn that started with the British initiative with Schwerin. At the very end of the year, after Schwerin had disappeared from the scene, the High Commissioners took note of the December Brussel's discussion on Europe's defense. McCloy indicated his agreement that it was time for defence talks to start. They did on 9 January 1951 at Petersberg. Heusinger and Speidel were present with Minister Theo Blank.

## THE ROCKY ROAD TO GEHLEN'S DREAM -- DER DIENST

Gehlen had taken the essential preparatory steps in the last months of the war. The beginning of the process of building "The Service" was when Captain John Boker walked into the room at a VIP interrogation center in Wiesbaden to find Gehlen asleep on a cot in a room shared with Pastor Niemoeller. For Gehlen, Boker



was exactly the right man. He was tall, distinguished in appearance, a New Yorker, third generation German from the cutlery industry of Sollingen in the Ruhr. Boker was a wartime intelligence officer, a major in 1945, with a reasonably detached view of Germans and Germany and a growing conviction that intelligence on the USSR would shortly be a valuable commodity. Boker spoke fluent German and the unaccented English that placed him in New England where he had graduated from Yale. As a wartime intelligence officer Boker had been through Camp Ritchie and at the end of the war was focusing on the realities of American's great wartime ally, the Soviet Union. Boker heard Gehlen's story and with credibility related it to the USFET G-2. Basically, he and Gehlen had a quick meeting of the minds. Boker gave Gehlen the opportunity to register his vision of the future and the role he saw for the survivors of Fremde Heer Ost. In that initial exchange, Gehlen also included in his proposal, the reassembling of Lieutenant Colonel Herman Baun and a cadre from an Abwehr organization to had collected Soviet intelligence provided to Gehlen's Fremde Heere Ost. The initial decision was to round up at Oberuersel the group of German officers who two months earlier had ended four years of looking at the Soviet Order of Battle as their main occupation and to recover and files the Fremde Heere Ost files -- both steps that the USFET G-2 would, in any case, have pursued.

no far reaching action

But by the end of July 1945 Gehlen and a half dozen of his associates were whisked off to Camp 1142 in Virginia for interrogation under more direct control of the G-2 in the Pentagon. There is no evidence that the decision to move Gehlen to the US in July 1945 was in any way related to the fragile deal that Gehlen had made with Boker and his superiors in the Frankfurt area. Gehlen's window of opportunity in Wiesbaden with John Boker and the USFET G-2 had closed.

Indeed, the decision made in Germany had not yet taken on a tangible form that could be described. The fate of Gehlen's plan by August 1945 rested on the understanding he had made with Boker and on two of his wartime associates -- Gerhard Wessel, Gehlen's longtime deputy in FHO and Herman Baun who had not yet been heard from. Eventually Baun turned up in the southern Allgaeu and joined Wessel in the "Blue House" om Oberuersel.

#### GEHLEN'S 1945-1946 CONTACTS IN WASHINGTON -- NO PROGRESS

In Washington in 1945 and 1946 Gehlen made several efforts but did not achieve any understanding or agreement on the future of himself and the group that was being assembled in Germany. His one concrete gain of great importance was to develop a firm relationship with Captain Eric Waldman who was assigned to Oberuersel just at the time of Gehlen's return in the summer of

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1946. Gehlen did have meetings with a large number of American intelligence officers, some of whom would later reappear in the later chapters of the Gehlen saga. But in the political atmosphere in Washington, essentially a reflection of the policy in JCS 1067, Gehlen found no takers on his proposal to revive Fremde Heere Ost and Leitstelle I Ost. It was while he and his group were at Camp 1142 that John Boker returned to the United States and returned to civilian life in New York City.

Back in Germany GEhlen was taken to Oberuersel and established in the Blue House. Relations with the USFE5 G-2, General Sibert seemed to have advanced. Wessel had an evaluation staff in being with their recovered files. Baun had built an agent organization that was producing intelligence on the Soviet force in East Germany, still very accessible across the zonal boundary and via Berlin. Baun had gone independent and a very difficult crisis ensued. In December 1947 the central elements of Operation Rusty moved to Pullach. The conflict with Baun and deep divisions in the organization developed. To some degree, these problems were never resolved. In early 1948 Gehlen took Adolf Heusinger into the organization as head of the evaluation, squarely on top of Gerhard Wessel who almost certainly understood why. A stead influx of former General Staff officers from the Mauerwald days in East Prussia was evident. In the field, out of view of Pullach, a number of recognized successful former operators from the SD and the Gestapo joined the fringes of the organization. A few moved into senior

positions. This expansion took place with no added funds but with an expanding flow of US Army goods into the real German civilian economy -- the black market in cigarettes, coffee, chocolate, canned meats, silk stockings etc. etc.

In the summer of 1948 the currency reform brought the introduction of the new Deutsche Mark. Like magic the German economy began to recover. Goods appeared in the often improvised shops in bombed out cities. The Black Market began to dry up falling mainly into the hands of the clever Jewish merchants coming in an organized stream out of Eastern Europe. The Gehlen Organization plunged into a deep and persisting financial crisis. The hundreds of clusters of former comrades in war, families and close friends ultimately supported and sheltered by the Gehlen Organization was not a problem that Gehlen was equipped to cope with. Crisis followed crisis in Gehlen's relations with the senior intelligence officers in Berlin, Frankfurt, Wiesbaden and Heidelberg. Gehlen sent letters threatening to dissolve the whole organization. ~~In~~ late 1947 the new CIA sent Sam Bossard to Germany to look at Operation Rusty. For weeks he became Eric Waldman's shadow, Bossard's report and recommendation, of which I have no recollection, advised a CIA takeover. The new CIA had enough problems of its own and said no. Gehlen's crises continued. The Army continued to send a mailbag containing \$125,000 a month to Pullach which an institutional black marketer of the German organization laundered it through Berlin getting the better rate on the DM-US Dollar

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made \*

exchange. The American colonel in command in Pullach managed to expand the flow of black market goods and Operation Rusty continued its hand-to-mouth existence. It was a bad time.

## LATE 1948 -CIA TAKES A SECOND LOOK AT OPERATION RUSTY

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In October 1948 the Pentagon requested once again that CIA look at Operation Rusty and I was assigned this task. As far as I know, there were no conditions. The Army did not indicate that it had any agreement with Gehlen. There was no reference to a "Gentlemen's Agreement" between Gehlen and Sibert. My instructions were to make a recommendation on whether there were parts of the operations that could be made available to various American intelligence efforts in Germany, what parts should be liquidated, what parts should be preserved and taken over by CIA. After six weeks I filed a 1900 word cable to Washington giving the opinion that Rusty was in fact a national intelligence service of which Reinhard Gehlen was the architect and dominant personality. At the end of 1948 we were beyond a point of no return. The decision should be made on the entire organization. Since it had no legal status at all and existed under the aegis of the US as an occupying power, there lay ahead a very serious problem integrating it with whatever emerged as a German government. I qualified my observation by emphasizing the superficial nature of my investigation and recommended that CIA simply take it over as is with the Army committed to

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admission*

continue its logistical and administrative support including the small military detachment of about ten officers and fifteen enlisted men. The Army administrative cover of the 78821 Composite Group would continue. CIA would provide financial support at the same level. I did not emphasize that a large part of the supply of US Quartermaster and PX supplies found their way into the black market. On the day that the Army transferred Rusty to CIA, the Army Commander, General Clarence Huebner issued an order that took the Gehlen Organization out of the black market. The \$125,000 provided each month by CIA could not support the operation, but CIA insisted the commitment was only to replace the Army's \$125,000. For Gehlen, this meant merely that protests of inactive financing was redirected from the US military to me. But we added to Gehlen's problems. While we were content to provide a lump sum for the operations into East Germany, we wanted to know more individually about claims of existing operations into the Soviet Union and the Satellite countries. We wanted to look at the individual operations, give it a project number and budget for these "strategic operations". Where the Army had show no interest in operations, CIA brought in a staff of German speaking case officers, many with OSS experience. Gehlen railed against this imposition. But even worse, CIA brought in first one and then two experienced finance officers who started pressing the administrative staff for budgets and accounting. If Gehlen had shown more trust in us from the outset, he might have avoided much of this. Although I blamed it all on the remote controllers in Washington, virtually all of the

demands for financial and operational data were cooked up in Pullach as a way of finding out more about this incipient intelligence service that seemed to have everything but its own government.

*Cont. of  
subject!*

In the end we found out there were a lot of good things about the Gehlen Organization. It was well on its way toward developing a very useful communications intelligence arm directed at the Soviet armed forces. Its evaluation staff, particularly on the whole question of the Soviet Armed Forces was probably at that time head and shoulders above anyone else. The massive agent operations in East Germany produced a steady flow of intelligence but the performance varied greatly. By far the most productive field organization was that headed by a man we knew as Dr. Hengl. His real name was Dr. \_\_\_\_\_.

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He had served with the Vlassov Army. He was at one time producing, I was told, 70 percent of the good information obtained on the Soviet forces -- mainly in East Germany. The Germans glossed over his former SD record. It may well be, as in many SD cases, that he as an individual had no war crimes record. It was not until years later that I learned of his SD background. (Footnote on Hengl needed here.)

During 1948 Gehlen had clearly reached an understanding on the objective of the three generals. Also, he set out in earnest to try and prepare the way for an eventual move of his organization

into a future government. The German Federal Republic was formed in 1949 and Conrad Adenauer was its first Chancellor. The capitol was established in Bonn. Gehlen now had a new intermediate target -- to develop contacts with and support in Bonn. A conflict between CIA and Gehlen immediately developed on the character and timing of his initiative in Bonn. CIA had not moved beyond my tentative assessment at the end of 1948. No consideration had been given on what we would want the High Commissioner to say to the new Chancellor about this outfit we had down in Munich. The problem was complicated by the fact that CIA had officers in Frankfurt, Berlin and Bonn who had opposed the whole idea of involvement with those General Staff officers in Pullach and developed ties with potential Gehlen opponents in Bonn, Frankfurt and Berlin. In November 1949 Washington requested a "moratorium" on political contacts in Bonn while CIA sorted out its short term tactics for dealing with Bonn.

The outbreak of war in Korea was the best thing that could have conceivably happened to Gehlen. The US had been caught with no forces and no war plan of any kind in Korea. Thirty days later a small force of 10,000 Americans brought in from Japan were in a desperately defended defense line above Pusan. The Pentagon and the State Department went into a sustained panic; it was recognized that the US had virtually no combat troops left in Europe; estimates varied on whether the Russians could be slowed at the Rhine or stopped at the English Channel. Gehlen's



military intelligence suddenly became a great bargain. The three generals had by the end of 1950 written the book for Bonn's remilitarization. Heusinger and Speidel joined Minister Theo Blank at the Petersberg in January 1951 with negotiation of a Bonn military force for eventual integration into the NATO command of General Dwight Eisenhower. Gehlen, with visions of Heusinger and Speidel back in uniform, became more impatient. But the French and the British were not buying the American package that included a new German Army.

Gehlen, in the period 1950 to 1953, gave more attention to developing support in Bonn and the intelligence services of Western Europe. His own staff constantly pressed him to give more attention to the internal management of his organization, its operational performance and its security. In early 1953 the East Germans appointed a new intelligence chief, Ernst Wollweber. He and the Soviets were reading intelligence from Bonn and Pullach that plans were afoot to move the Gehlen Organization into Bonn as its intelligence arm. The East Germans and the Soviets had obviously developed a number of penetrations of Gehlen's enormous effort into East Germany and launched a sustain propaganda operation. It was a devastating and well done performance. If there were any plans in Bonn to form a service and take-over the Gehlen Organization on 1 April 1953 they were shelved. The Soviets continued to hammer the Gehlen Organization claiming widespread penetration. April 1, 1954 slipped by.

*Fuck  
\*report\**

By late 1953 and early 1954 there was an intensive search underway in the counterespionage staff in Pullach. Analysis indicated there was almost certainly a mole in the headquarters. An internal security search brought Heinz Felfe under scrutiny but nothing was proved. The American CIC was deeply engaged in penetrating the Gehlen Organization, withholding its information from CIA and making no effort to put its information to good use in helping the Germans with their security problems. In 1955 a senior field agent of Gehlen in the Frankfurt area was jailed by the Bonn police where he committed suicide leaving evidence that he was a long-time and highly developed CIC penetration of Gehlen's counterespionage organization. Gehlen could not be persuaded that CIA was not behind the operation and a deep chill developed in Pullach. The Soviets fed disinformation into CIA and the Gehlen Organization to heighten tensions. While all of this was going on, senior officers of the American Army initiated a campaign to persuade Adenauer to abandon Gehlen. It was a gross miscalculation but further fed Gehlen's distrust of the Americans. In the end, of course, the BND was formed on 1 April 1956 and Gehlen became its first President. It had been a long and rocky road!

THIS ENDS OF THE FIRST DRAFT OF A CHAPTER ON  
REINHARD GEHLEN

Germany.

## GEHLEN BECOMES A SAILOR

Soon after my 1948 arrival in Munich I had bought a much used 22 foot, Marconi-rigged, M-class sailboat with a painted canvas-covered deck and a pull-up center-board instead of a keel -- an ideal boat that offered flexibility in getting in and out of various parts of the lake, including the shallow water between the shore and the romantic Roseninsel where Sissy, a Wittelsbach daughter, had as a child spent time on the small island. Later she became the Empress Elizabeth of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as the wife of Franz Josef. The fifteen square meter mainsail of my boat was marked with a huge black M denoting its class. The fact that I signed papers in Pullach with a large M (for Marshall) with a line through it suggested to those uninformed on sailing that I had put a monograph on the boat. I had hauled the boat up from the Traunsee in Austria and kept it for some years at the Starnberg marine and yacht club. My children, friends and I spent hundreds of hours over the years on the twenty kilometer long Starnbergersee which, on a clear day, is within sight of the snow-capped Alps in spring, winter and autumn.

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Dr. Hans Winter was a sailor, lived on the opposite side of the lake and further south. He served as my agent in the negotiated sale and said that he would undertake to interest Gehlen in sailing. I sold the boat for DM 700, the equivalent of \$200 at

that time. That is what I had paid for it in Austrian Schillings some years earlier. I received the DM 700 from Hans Winter and left the boat where it was in the Starnberg marina. About a year or two later when I visited Gehlen at Berg, he took me down to the lake below his house where the boat was moored. He had become an enthusiastic sailor. I noted a larger, newer and far more complicated boat moored next to my old M class and asked him who was the owner of this beautiful craft. He hesitated for a moment and then, smilingly, as if he were announcing a new high-level recruitment in the Kremlin, told me that it was a recent present from the British. My old M class boat remained in the service of the Gehlen family for many years; it may still be there.

#### GEHLEN'S INTENSITY OF PURPOSE

Gehlen's one great over-riding quality was his intensity of purpose. Having arrived, by 1944 or even earlier, at his strategic estimate of what the postwar world would look like, Gehlen identified and pursued his own objectives with a stubborn and unrelenting vigor. I am sure this characteristic was deeply rooted in his genes but also reflected something of his own general staff training. When I was a student at the Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, a British colonel fresh from the North African campaigns of 1942 urged the Command and General Staff class he was addressing to learn and remember above all else a single paragraph he had found in our own

American Field Manual 105-1 --which reads "The objective of the command having been determined, all actions which contributed to its attainment will be vigorously pursued; those which do not will be avoided." That adequately describes Gehlen's management of his organization and the conduct of his own efforts in the long decade between his decision late in the war and the birth of the German Intelligence Service in 1956. It was a performance that was sustained; he was always impatient, unforgiving of his opponents and aloof and often less than frank and honest with his colleagues in maintaining movement toward his end objective -- creation of the BND.

Mixed with this intensity was, I thought, a personal insecurity that reflected itself in a demonstrated need for recognition -- a Geltungsbeduerfniss. Gehlen loved to chalk up intelligence firsts - - even at the cost of some embellishment and exaggeration. There was in him a touch of the spy story romanticist. At times this got him into some difficulties. There was an enormous contradiction in his fascination with dramatic and counterespionage cases with a political angle and the duller business of timely, sustained and in depth management to the security of his organization. I think it is fair to observe that Felfe seemed to recognize this characteristic and succeeded in exploiting it.

Gehlen found himself in 1947 with an operating field organization that Baun had built. Baun regarded it as his half of the fifty-fifty


deal he thought he had made. Gehlen pushed ahead, firing Baun. Gehlen may have thought he could bring the field organization under control. He never stopped to deal with basic security problems he had inherited until near catastrophe struck with the KGB and East German orchestrated an expose of his vulnerabilities. The anticipated legalization on 1 April 1953 slipped to 1954 and then to 1955. By then the US Army, having found that Bonn was moving toward a GIS rather than a G-2 that the US Army might dominate, tried to derail the whole Gehlen operation. The Army was strengthened in this effort by its ability to charge Gehlen with too many losses in East Germany. The Army had a point but they were ignoring larger issues. In 1954 and 1955 it was too late to go back and face the neglect of problems that had their roots in the earlier postwar circumstances. All western services at that time were paying the price for mistakes in the late forties. But Gehlen did not have time. Getting over the legalization hurdle was his immediate aim. So with characteristic intensity he pushed ahead, papering over and kicking under the rug some problems while \_\_\_\_\_ from strength on others. When CIA's Office of Special Operations bought a lot of enemy controlled Eastern European and Russian operations in the early 1950s, the Director of Central Intelligence was not faced with losing all. Gehlen still had no official status. What he did have, was a fully developed service with all of the parts. His evaluation staff was arguably as good as any in the world with Soviet conventional order of battle still the centerpiece. His communications intelligence effort had

More to  
Baun

grown steadily with far more help from the Americans than he probably understood and would never acknowledge. By 1955 Gehlen had a bureau of codes and cyphers meticulously, and quite illegally -- under the occupation rules --, developed over the years. Moreover, Gehlen had liaison arrangements with all of the Western intelligence services who, one by one, had signalled the support of their governments to support the move of the Gehlen Organization into the frame of an official BND. In those critical months leading up to the act of creating the BND, Gehlen battened down the hatches and simply overpowered the opposition and offered Bonn a central intelligence service with all of its parts and one that had the full support of the evolving German military establishment. The final act was taken on 22 February 1956 and is reflected in a single sentence decision in a Cabinet meeting: "Es wird eine Nachrichtendienst eingerichtet. Er wurde dem Bundeskanzleramt angegliedert." Gehlen had landed his boat in Bonn. Along the way it had served a lot of purposes, among them as a lifeboat and safe haven for what little remained of the German General Staff. What was emerging was a German national security system designed specifically to fit smoothly into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I think that was the intention of Reinhard Gehlen from the first. The bottom line was that Gehlen had a dream and with enormous intensity of purpose made it come true.

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## THE SCOPE AND CHARACTER OF GEHLEN'S AMBITIONS AFTER WW II

There is in the record a statement of Graf von Kielmannsegg, allegedly made at the height of the controversy over remilitarization policy in 1950 that Gehlen's goal was domination, i.e. die Oberung, of the future defense ministry. I did not find this too surp[rising in that context since several of my closest associates in the CIA staff in Pullach argued at the height of the 1950 struggle for power among the German generals, that Gehlen aspired to be a "latter day Von Seekt" saving the German General Staff for another day. The fact is that the facility, funds and organization centered in Pullach became a kind of life raft, a safe haven and a remarkably well suited institution that supported in divers ways the strategy of three generals who organized and prepared themselves as a nucleus of a future  German Bunderwehr just at the moment in history when American policies were moving in the same direction. The Americans who established Operation Rusty at Oberuersel in 1945 did not plan it that way. At the request and insistence of the Pentagon in 1947 and again in 1948, CIA took over Operation Rusty with no commitment beyond taking a more thorough look at a large and complex operation. CIA's first decision was to identify the operation more accurately as the "Gehlen Organization" since his personal influence and decided to was really because of his dominant role.the Gehlen Organization



and was already a fairly full-blown national intelligence service. In 1948, still under the United States Army in Germany, the character changed with a significant influx of former German General Staff officers, including Adolf Heusinger, the veteran operations chief from the Eastern Front. CIA assumed responsibility on 1 July 1949 when General Lucius Clay, who after 1947 was both Military Governor and the senior military commander. Clay delayed the transfer to CIA until his departure from Europe set for 1 July 1949. All that had happened after 15 March 1947 had happened on Clay's watch in Germany as both Military Governor and CINC USFET. But I have never seen any evidence that he recognized what was going on. I have seen no record of either his interest in or a visit to Pullach. Adolf Heusinger made no secret of what he was up to and clearly saw himself as moving with the times. In the first four months as the CIA officer in charge in Pullach, I came to understand quite well what the three generals were doing and planned to do. In late 1949 they were mainly telling other German officers to sit down and be quiet until the West asked Germany to rearm. Most of them did just that. Until the Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel, nobody in Washington showed any interest in my tale of three generals. By then, they were ahead of changing times.

Gehlen had not changed his objective at all. His eye was firmly focused on his aim to build a German intelligence service. But he recognized the advantage of moving forward in lock-step with the three generals to ensure that the two efforts would be

mutually supportive in advising the future Chancellor on these import elements of a national security system. And that is the way it worked out although it took roughly six years to get all of the pieces in place. After May 1945 Gehlen never again donned a uniform and I never saw any evidence he intended to do so. \*

The events of 1950 moved Chancellor Adenauer and his Cabinet rapidly forward to some significant and quite far reaching decisions on the character and made-up of the future Bundeswehr and the former army, navy and air force officers who would form the senior cadre for the new forces. Gehlen's involvement in the events of 1950 were mainly a strong reaction to the Graf Schwerin episode, with what seemed obviously British support, to hastily assemble a quasi-official German intelligence group in the Bundeskanzleramt. Gehlen's reaction was in part his anger with what he perceived to be indifference and an unwillingness of CIA and the American High Commissioner to become actively engaged. As it turned out, American attention was not needed. \*

Schwerin disappeared from the scene. Gehlen, through a connection with Dr. Hans Globke, a new face in the Bundeskanzleramt in mid-summer 1950, established direct contact with the Chancellor himself and was in a position to provide very close intelligence support to the BKA and to the military planners at and following Himerode. But except for these intelligence actions, Gehlen played no direct role in the